

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ISCTE





28 OUTUBRO 2016 FCUL Ed. C8 | Sala 8.2.12 | 14h

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AND

# 28 OUTUBRO 2016

Friday FCUL Ed. C8 | Sala 8.2.12 | 14h

- 14h00 LSE Team (MB/CT/IM) Antecedents of RICOS project
- 14h30 António Zilhão (CFCUL)
- **Rational Agency:** *do birds, rats or chimpanzees do better than humans?* Coordination Chris Tennant
- 15h15 Klaus Gaertner (CFCUL) \16h00 Getting rid of concepts. Should we revise Folk Psychology? Cordination Joaquim Pires Valentim

#### INTERVAL

- 16h30 João Arriscado Nunes (University of Coimbra)
   \17h15 Common sense and partial connections, or enacting the "common" and making "sense"
   Coordination Paula Castro
- 17h15 **João Manuel de Oliveira (CIS-IUL)** \18h00 *Precarious paradoxes: The field of gender studies.* Coordination Ivana Markova
- 20h30 Dinner at the restaurante Club i (located in the ISCTE IUL building)

# **COMMON SENSE AND SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

Lisboa, Outubro 2016 Project RICOS (Reconsidering Common Sense) CIS-IUL (Center of Social Studies of the University Institute of Lisbon)

# 29 OUTUBRO 2016



José Pinto (Universidade Lusófona) 09h00 Hume, Common sense and Technology Coordination Jorge Correia Jesuino

Alexander Gerner (CFCUL)09h45Probing Cognitive Enhancements in Social "Resonance":\10h30the case of aesthetic community of sensing and playing music together<br/>Coordination Martin Bauer\10h30

Ivana Markova (University of Stirling;LSE)10h30Thêmata in Science and common Sense\11h15Coordination Lucy Baugnet

#### INTERVAL

 Paula Castro (CIS-IUL)
 11h30

 Local knowledge and scientific knowledge in the governance of environmental problems:reciprocal imagination Coordination Joaquim Pires Valentim
 11h30

Jorge Correia Jesuino (CIS IUL;CFCUL)12h15From the science of common sense to the common sense of science\12h30

**LSE Team** 12h30 Final comments \13h00









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# COMMON SENSE AND SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Project RICOS (Reconsidering Common Sense)









## ANTÓNIO ZILHÃO

CFCUL

Rational Agency: do birds, rats or chimpanzees do better than humans?

The debate concerning human rationality revolves typically around four models: 1) Unbounded rationality (UC); 2) Optimization under constraints (OuC); 3) Heuristics and biases (H&B); and 4) Ecological rationality (ER). Proponents of models 3) and 4) criticize models 1) and 2) for their cognitive unrealism. However, many ethologists contend that it makes sense to account for data gathered in animal behaviour research along these lines. Elaborating upon this claim, Stanovich introduced a fifth model into the debate - Brute Rationality (BR). According to him, traditional rational choice models, rather than being appropriate to account for the behavior of humans, are powerful tools to account for the behavior of creatures endowed with much simpler cognitive architectures. What are we to make of this dispute? I'll contend that the positions defining it reveal themselves to be much less clear than what is usually taken to be the case

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#### **KLAUS GÄRTNER**

CFCUL

#### Getting rid of concepts. Should we revise Folk Psychology?

It is often held that concepts in folk psychology are too strong. Consider, for instance, the case of identifying self-knowledge about the phenomenal. When we have, say, a red experience, we are in a position to identify what it is like to perceive red, i.e. phenomenal redness. This seems very obvious, since we usually think that this is the way discern experiences in the first place and, according to Lewis (Lewis 1992), folk psychology subscribes to this idea. There is, however, a hidden problem with this idea, since it requires the revelation (identification) thesis. This thesis states that simply by having an experience with a particular phenomenal character. I am in the position to know the essence of this particular phenomenal character. But knowing the essence of something implies 'an uncommonly demanding and literal sense of "knowing what" (Lewis 1992). Therefore, to identify a particular phenomenal character, the knowledge I have, has ruled out any other possible property as content apart from the one that this particular phenomenal character possesses. As a consequence, I need to know, necessarily, a property of the phenomenal character that only this particular phenomenal character has and no other does. According to Lewis (Lewis 1992), anyone who calls himself a materialist cannot subscribe to this thesis, because it implies that I could know neurological facts simply by having an experience. As a consequence, we should delete this concept from folk psychology.

In this paper, I will ask the question whether or not we really should revise folk psychology. In my view, concepts of folk psychology are often extremely intuitive. Unless we have very good reasons, we should avoid this conclusion. I will, therefore, argue that even the strong revelation (identification) thesis is not hopelessly lost and that we do not have to get rid of this concept.

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Cordination: Joaquim Pires Valentim



#### **JOÃO ARRISCADO NUNES**

University of Coimbra

Common sense and partial connections, or, enacting the "common" and making "sense"

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Common sense, beyond the disagreeements on its precise attributes, limitations or potential, is usually regarded as a condition for competent social life, but also for active engagement with the world affording operations of inquiry, as John Dewey (1938) was keen to point out. This point is worth labouring on, since common sense is often assumed to promote or encourage conformity and conservative responses to innovation and to disquieting or unifamiliar events and situations. This suggests that a productive way of undestanding what common sense stands for may be to scrutinize it through its breaches.

Common sense appears, indeed, to provide a coherent set of benchmarks against which to acknowledge, under given social and historical conditions and situations, the exceptional, the unusual, the problematic, the unruly, the urgent or the dangerous. Interruptions of routine, habit or normality, are recognizable as such against a shared background of normality, of a stable and predictable order of the world.

But a different kind of breach of familiarity and normality may occur, associated with a failure to routinely display competences regarded as common to all normal, reasonable people. This kind of breach is often gathered under the umbrella term of "unreason". Persons diagnosed with mental conditions are thus regarded as exhibiting, through a range of symptoms or actions, that failure to relate "normally" and in predictable, "reasonable" ways to the world and to other people. Recent approaches to mental health have drawn on therapeutic procedures – including, prominently, artistic-expressive activities - aimed at restoring the capacity to live in a shared, recognizable and predictable world. The processes through which this restoration is attempted provide occasions to follow the practical accomplishment of common sense and what we may call, borrowing from John Law, its fractional coherence.

The case discussed here draws on an ongoing collaboration with a Brazilian colleague, Raquel Siqueira-Silva, based on her ANT-inspired work on the constitution of collectives of musicians as part of the process of the Brazilian Psychiatric Reform. Through her research and involvement in that process, she documented and discussed the "becoming artist" of mental health patients involved in music therapy activities. In our ongoing work, over the last five years, we have pursued the inquiry on how a new "common" is enacted through the forms of dissonant collaboration involved in "musicking" and the making of a "sense" shared not only by the patient/musicians, but also through the public recognition of their accomplishments as music, assessed through the aesthetic and technical criteria of the musical genres involved.

Through the making and unmaking of what Marylin Strathern describes as partial connections, those carrying the stigma of "madness" are thus able to claim recognition of a difference associated with attributes publicly recognized as those of the artist. In the process, common sense, rather than a "cultural system", appears as the always provisional outcome of the interference of the situated, partial making of connections that interfere and overlap, displaying an ever-changing fractional coherence.



#### JOÃO MANUEL DE OLIVEIRA

ISCTE-IUL

#### Precarious paradoxes: the field of gender studies

Marked by a thematic model of production and constitution of knowledge and by a profound interdisciplinarity, gender studies have confronted the disciplines with a new way of constructing knowledge concerning gender. The concept of gender is introduced into academia through feminist epistemologies and by the demands of social movements. Sharing with cultural studies, ethnic studies and critical studies of sexualities, the status of contested knowledges that are permeable to conflict of values and ideologies, especially from the more conservative forces in the academia, gender studies face a paradoxical reception and institutionalisation best described by Maria do Mar Pereira (2012) as dismissive recognition. Whilst, public policies at national, regional and global increasingly use knowledge derived from gender studies, mainly driven by societal demands of social change or specific forms of technical and technological intervention (e.g., the case of trans\* transitioning, feminist psychotherapy, sexual and reproductive health, etc.). Such demands give a public and political visibility to the fieldm evident in mass media coverage of the field. At the same time, traditional and conservative academias are still suspicious of this porosity of gender studies. This disavowal is akin to the rejection of the effects of post-structuralism and feminism in epistemologies. This field is an interesting point of observation of the contradiction between this dismissive recognition and the growing importance of the field in contemporary societies and social policies. Delegitimised by the more positivistic and conservative fields in social sciences, nevertheless social relations of gender have gained market value, visible at the level of funding. Like feminist theory, origin and foundation of gender studies, these seem to be the precarious product of a paradox (Pollock, 1996). A paradox in reception marked by a partial disavowal, a gameplay between objectivitiy and neutrality (a god-trick certain academias still play, despite Haraway's 1988 warning) and the technoscientific eagerness to grab hold of the funding. This produces interesting torsions and combinations of multifarious effects of this dismissive recognition, along with the pleasure in the confusion of boundaries this field promotes.

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Coordination: Ivana Markova



#### **ALEXANDER GERNER**

CFCUL, PhD | amgerner@fc.ul.pt

Probing Cognitive Enhancements in Social "resonance": the case of aesthetic community of sensing and playing music together.

# 29 OUTUBRO 2016

**ISCTE** Ed. 2 | Sala C2.05 | 9h

09h45 \ 10h30 Coordination: Martin Bauer

Enhancement, considering social self-other relation and the 2PP, we will rehearse the senso comunis (κοινή αϊσθησις) concept and metaphor of "resonance" in the contemporary debate on >resonance< as acoustic and multimodal figure of thought in the humanities in disciplines such as social cognitive sciences, phenomenological psychiatry, philosophy of biology and social musicality. Hereby we will concentrate on aspects of resonance in the sense of an approach of musical enactive rehearsals of embodied interaffectivity and the creation of a musical community in musical social interaction.

In my general aim to develop a non-reductionist Philosophy of Cognitive

The phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1951{1972}) in his essay "Gemeinsam Musizieren. Die Studie einer sozialen Beziehung" identifies pre-language forms of *Aisthesis* -in aesthetic situations of common music making- as foundations of social mutual "tuning-in" related to musicians and their common non-semantic, pre-conceptual sense-making structures of what can be called *joint musicality*. These musical social relations and rehearsals as condition of possibility of any kind of social intersubjectivity and communication, grounded in its temporal joint tuning-in, Schütz calls "wechselseitige Beziehung des sich auf einander Einstimmens" and will be related to "resonance", "entrainment", tuning-in, synchronicity in aesthetic interaction and joint non-action and applied to problems posed in the field of medical enhancements of social relations.



#### **IVANA MARKOVÁ**

University of Stirling;LSE

#### Themata in science and common sense

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ISCTE

Ed. 2 | Sala C2.05 | 9h

10h30 \ 11h15 Coordination: Lucy Baugnet

Human thinking is heterogeneous, and among its different kinds, thinking in dyadic oppositions is associated with the concept of themata. This concept is transdisciplinary, bridging the domains of sciences and the humanities. Gerald Holton characterises themata as basic elements of thought that underlie both scientific and non-scientific thinking.

Themata originate from the interdependence between the individual and socially shared thinking and therefore, they have a psychological and a collective component. Gerald Holton's scientific imagination, which is based on single case studies of physicists, shows the unique creations of individual scientists that are rooted in underlying and collectively shared themata. Likewise, in common-sense thinking, themata arise from the interdependence between activities of individuals and the collectives (groups, institutions, traditions).

Themata occur in different forms, such as a thematic concept, a methodological (or epistemological) thema and a propositional thema. In sciences, the thematic concept or the thematic component of a concept, usually refers to the development and transformation of the content of the thema, for example, of atom/wave or stability/change. The second usage refers to a methodological thema. A methodological thema has an epistemological role: it guides the direction of the pursuit of science, for example, analysis/synthesis. The third use, that is, a thematic proposition or a hypothetical thema, has potentiality for further development of a particular physical theory.

These different uses of themata can be also identified in common sense thinking. A thematic concept refers to the content and transformation of meanings of specific dyadic oppositions, for example, moral/immoral or man/woman. The methodological (epistemological) thema of the dialogical approach in social representations is the Self/Other. From this epistemological thema, thematic concepts with specific contents are derived, for example, trust/distrust or security/risk.



#### **PAULA CASTRO**

ISCTE-IUL and CIS-IUL

Scientific knowledge and local knowledge: mapping reciprocal imaginations

In this presentation I will argue that for understanding public responses to certain

domains of environmental governance - biodiversity conservation and resources affected by Climate Change (CC) - it is productive to take Local Knowledge more seriously than it has been taken so far. Usual governance formats for these domains involve decisions negotiated and made at the global level - and increasingly supported by scientific evidence - to be implemented at the local level. Consequently, these decisions but also, and crucially, the knowledge and meaning categories supporting them, need to be translated from the global to the local (Castro, 2012). This has positioned place at the center of the concerns of a multiplicity of actors with different capacities for having their knowledge recognized - scientists, farmers, fishers, local authorities - and also at the center of conflicts contesting and resisting governance proposals. Studies about both "expert-public relations" and "people-place relations" have concurrently increased as ways of understanding these conflicts. Regarding "expert-public relations" research has shown the pervasiveness of the hegemonic representation (by experts) of publics as generally ignorant and un-involved (Welsh & Wynne, 2013; Castro & Mouro, 2016). Regarding "people-place relations", research has shown how place attachments, place identity, place memories play a central role in public responses to environmental governance (see Adger et al., 2012). In these efforts around place a thread seems however to be missing in most cases: that of place knowledge as knowledge. Yet, although interwoven with meaning and identity, local knowledge can be seen also as knowledge, i.e., as encompassing information and experience (Scott, 1994), as a "knowing by way of practice" (Ingold, 2011) capable of mobilizing very detailed and fine descriptions relevant for biodiversity or CC governance (Castro & Mouro, 2016), in particular when food-linked practices (e.g., fishing and farming) are involved. Taking this knowledge as knowledge suggests that research needs to develop a more systematic and integrated mapping

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of how (1) experts see local knowledge in these specific domains; (2) farmers and fishers as publics see scientific knowledge in these specific domains; and also of how (3) experts see their own knowledge and (4) farmers and fishers as publics see their own knowledge. This mapping of reciprocal imaginations would help in better dealing with the conflicts-in-place unfolding in these domains. For advancing this project, in this presentation, I draw on interviews and focus groups with farmers and fishers in *Natura 2000* sites for showing how they imagine their scientists and experts. I show how they reclaim their local knowledge as information and experience, and as having something to teach, offering lived examples and details of the land and sea, but can nevertheless negotiate ways of accepting certain dimensions of expert knowledge. I discuss how local knowledge is not only an important input in itself for the environmental governance of these domains, but also provides a main lens through which scientific knowledge is locally assessed; I conclude by arguing that this re-enforces the need to continue to map reciprocal imaginations in more detailed and domain-specific ways.