The Symbiotic Phenomenon in the Evolutive Context

Francisco Carrapiço  
(Departament of Plant Biology, Faculty of Science, Lisbon University, Portugal)

Symbiosis has frequently been considered as a biological curiosity, and not as a scientific concept, namely in the scope of evolution. Nevertheless, symbiosis is a widespread phenomenon, with great biological relevance, that has a fundamental role in the organization and evolution of life. Despite this fact, it has not received proper attention either from the scientific community, or from the university and high school curricula. This situation reflects itself in an interpretative reality of the biological evolution, based on two classical scientific theories: Darwinism and neo-Darwinism, the only ones that, traditionally, try to explain this process and where symbiosis is not adequately understood nor handled. For traditional evolutionist authors, symbiosis is nothing more than a residual aspect of the evolution problem. Recent data, however, point in the opposite direction, showing that symbiosis is a factor of evolutive change, which cannot be included in the framework of the neo-Darwinism theory. Questions such as the following ones should have a clear and scientific answer and should not be put aside simply because they do not correspond to the mainstream discourse. Why is the symbiotic phenomenon so widespread in nature? Why and how does it perpetuate itself through time? What is its degree of importance for the intervening organisms? Why do living beings present structural, physiological and/or behavioral changes so well adapted to this relationship? What is the role of the symbiosis in the evolutionary process? In this sense, symbiogenesis should be understood as an evolutive mechanism and symbiosis as the vehicle, through which that mechanism unfolds. This fact represents a point of view which is opposed to that of the neo-Darwinism or Modern Synthesis Theory. Thus, according to today's dominant theory, evolution is a gradual process essentially consisting of a natural selection conducted on minimal phenotypical variations. However, most living forms have symbiotic relationships with microorganisms, and so symbiosis seems to play a very important role in the origin, organization and life evolution. It is an important support for the acquisition of new genomes and new metabolic capacities, which drives living forms’ organization and evolution. In this sense, the evolutionary changes can be explained by an integrated cooperation between organisms, in which symbiosis acts, not as an exception, but as the dominant rule in nature. To put it in a nutshell, is the development of life a saltational symbiotic process or a gradual process, oriented by natural selection and leading organisms to adaptation? In a way, this dilemma may be found in two positions clearly expressed by Theodosius Dobzhansky and Jan Sapp. In 1973, Theodosius Dobzansky wrote his famous article entitled “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”, where he transmits the neo-Darwinist view of evolution. Thirty years after this article, Jan Sapp (2003) includes in his book, “Genesis: the Evolution of Biology”, a new paradigmatic concept: “Nothing in evolution makes sense except in the light of symbiosis”, giving shape to the new ideas on the process of evolution, involving symbiotic principles. Actually, and specially since 1859 - the year of the publication of Darwin's book “On the Origin of Species” - evolution has been considered as the fundamental concept and organizing factor of modern biology, as well as its structural pillar. Without denying many of the Darwinist principles, the worse thing we could do within the study of the process of evolution would be to mix up or limit evolution to the Darwinist or neo-Darwinist perspective. This leads to the erroneous idea that Darwinism, or neo-Darwinism, are the only synonyms for biological evolution. Other evolutionist approaches exist and it is necessary for them to be deepened and discussed within biological and social sciences. In this sense, we would like to bring a set of principles and data that could be integrated in a Symbiogenic Theory of Evolution that could contribute towards a new epistemological approach of the symbiotic phenomenon in the evolutive context. This, in our point of view, could be the beginning of a new paradigm in science that rests almost unexplored.

Nancy Cartwright
(Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, UK)

with

Sheldon Steed 
(Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, UK)

Bosbach and the Riecan States on Pseudo-Residuated Lattices

Lavinia Ciungu 
(Mathematics Polytechnical University of Bucharest, Romania)

<sup>The states were first introduced for commutative structures of MV-algebras by D. Mundici in [2] and for BL-algebras by B. Riečan in [3]. In the case of noncommutative fuzzy structures, they were introduced by A. Dvurečenskij in [4] for pseudo-MV algebras, by G. Goergescu in [5]  for pseudo-BL algebras  and by A. Dvurečenskij and J. Rachůnek in [6] for bounded noncommutive Rl-monoids.  

In the case of pseudo-MV algebras, A. Dvurečenskij proved in [7] that any pseudo-MV algebra M is isomorphic to Γ(G, u)={gєG/0≤g≤u}, where (G,u) is an l-group with strong unit u. It allowed him to define a partial addition +, where x+y is defined if x≤ y‾=u-y. The other noncommutative structures don’t have such a group representation and it was more difficult to define the notion of states for these structures. In the case of pseudo-BL algebras, G. Georgescu proved that any Bosbach state is also a Riečan state, and he left as an open problem to find an example of Riečan state on a good pseudo-BL algebra which is not a Bosbach state. In the case of good bounded noncommutative Rl-monoids, Dvurečenskij gives an aswer to this problem proving that any Riečan state is at the same time a Bosbach state.  

Inspired by the above mention results, in this paper we extend the notion of states to pseudo-residuated lattices and the final results prove that in this case any Bosbach state is also a Riečan state, but the converse is not true, which answers to Georgescu’s open problem.  
We first give the definition a pseudo-residuated lattice and we prove the basic properties of this structure, also valid for other structures such as pseudo-BL algebras, weak pseudo BL-algebras and bounded noncommutative Rl-monoids. The distance functions are defined, being very important for proving some of the main results. Then, we define the Bosbach and Riečan states on pseudo-residuated lattices, we investigate their basic properties, proving that any Bosbach state is a Riečan state. As an aswer to Georgescu’s open problem, we give an example of a Riečan state on a good pseudo-residuated lattice which is not a Bosbach state.</sup>

^References

^{[1] A. Dvurečenkij, S. Pulmannova, “New Trends in Quantum Structures”, Kluwer Acad. Oubl., Dordrecht, Ister Science, Bratislava, 2000.  
[2] D. Mundici, “Averaging the truth- value in Lukasiewicz sentential logic”, Studia Logica 55 (1995), 113-127.  
[3] B. Riečan, “On the probability on BL- algebras”, Acta Math. Nitra 4 (2000), 3-13.  
[4] A. Dvurečenkij, “States on pseudo- MV algebras”, Studia Logica 68 (2001), 301-327.  
[5] G. Georgescu, “Bosbach states on fuzzy structures”, Soft Computing 8 (2004), 217-230.  
[6] A. Dvurečenskij, J. Rachůnek, “On Riecan and Bosbach States for Bounded Noncommutative Rl- Monoids”, Preprint Series, Mathematical Institute Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2005.  
[7] A. Dvurečenskij, “Pseudo- MV algebras are intervals in l- groups ”, J. Australian Math. Soc. 70 (2002), 427-445.}

A Unified Account of Irrationality

Vasco Correia
(Université Paris IV, France)

According to formal accounts of rationality, which prevail in rational choice theories, we should limit ourselves to consider as irrational cases in which an agent acts or thinks counter to his own conception of what is reasonable, in other words cases in which the agent transgresses his own norms of rationality. The formal criterion of irrationality would then be the inner inconsistency in the agent’s mind, arising either between his actions and his decisions, at a practical level, or between two of his beliefs, at a cognitive level. The interest of such a formal account is that it does not prejudge of the agent’s moral principles or values, allowing for an approach of rationality independent of any moral assumptions. 
Under these conditions, self-deception and akrasia (or “weakness of will”) appear to be the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. Admittedly, the reason for this is that in both cases the agent seems to “conspire” against himself. The akratic agent is the one that deliberately acts contrary to what he judges to be his best interest, and the self-deceiver deliberately believes contrary to what he suspects to be the truth. In appearance, at least, this undermines the most common assumptions in theories of rationality: namely, that we tend to act upon what we judge better; and that we tend to believe what seems to be the truth. In an attempt to understand these paradoxes, many authors have proposed radical hypotheses, such as the partition of the mind, the existence of mental tropisms, and of course the existence of an unconscious. 
My first claim is that irrationality (both cognitive and practical) can be understood without assuming that the mind is divided. The key to this view is the suggestion that the cause of irrationality is neither a conscious intention of acting contrary to what the agent considers himself to be reasonable (Sartre, Davidson, Pears), nor the direct effect of an unconscious desire (Freud, Audi), but rather the influence of our emotions (desires, fears, hopes, etc.) over the process of belief formation. This claim is supported by the vast empirical evidence provided by social psychology in the recent decades, clearly showing that emotions indeed distort our beliefs in a variety of ways, namely by affecting the cognitive processes involved in the formation of belief (biased attention to evidence, biased interpretation of available evidence, selective memory, selective evidence gathering, etc.). Thus, although we seem unable to believe something “at will”, simply because we want to, it may sometimes happen that our motives surreptitiously lead us to believe what we wish were the case (wishful thinking), even if this means accepting a certain proposition in the teeth of evidence, which is precisely what self-deception is about.
But could such a cognitive model of irrationality be extended to the practical sphere and successfully explain weak-willed actions? My second claim is precisely that the influence our motives may exert over our judgments also accounts for genuine cases of practical irrationality. As some authors have recently pointed out (Eslter, Ainslie, Bird), and as Socrates seems to suggest in Plato’s Protagoras, weakness of will can be understood as a sort of «myopia» that seems to affect human beings in what concerns time preferences. Loosely speaking, the idea is simply that, other things being equal, we tend to prefer immediate small rewards to future greater rewards. For example, if one has to choose between a small early reward (e.g. eating dessert after a meal) and a greater future reward (e.g. loosing some weight), the early reward might appear to be bigger than the delayed and, in consequence, one ends up eating a dessert. Thus, the acratic action does not appear to stem from a so-called “weakness of the will”, but simply from an evaluation illusion, which leads the agent to miscalculate the expected value of each option and, consequently, to choose an option that doesn’t maximize his interest. This argument will then bring us to a more general conclusion, namely that practical irrationality stems from cognitive irrationality, and that they both result of the several ways in which our desires may bias our judgments. 

The Principle of Eurhythmy. A Key to the Unity of Physics

José Croca 
(Faculty of Sciences, Lisbon University, Portugal)

The aim of Physics has always been the Unity. This ideal means that physicists look for a very basic principle from which it would, at last in principle, be possible to derive the laws for describing the physical reality at different scales of observation. Presently in physics we are faced with two independent, even opposite, theories valid at different scales. The classical physics, and the quantum physics. Classical physics good at the macroscopic scale while quantum physics is valid at the atomic and molecular level. The unification of the different physical laws, from classical physics, quantum physics to gravitic physics seems now possible. The key for this unity is the principle of Eurhythmy. The word comes from the Greek meaning, literally, the principle of the adequate path. It will be shown that Hieron´s principle of minimum path, Fermat´s principle of minimum time, basic for the classical physics, and de Broglie´s guiding principle, a cornerstone for the nonlinear causal quantum physics, are no more than mere particular cases of the principle of eurhythmy. Furthermore, it will be seen, with concrete examples, from classical physics, quantum physics to gravitic physics, that all these different branches of physics, can be unified and understood in a causal way as particular cases of this general principle. This principle allows us to see the diverse aspects at different scales of observation of the physical reality as a single coherent causal and beautiful whole.


Bibliography

J.R. Croca, Towards a Nonlinear Quantum Physics, World Scientific, London, 2003.

Argumentative Pluralism

Cédric Dégremont 
Laurent Keiff
(University of  Lille III, France)

^{Logical pluralism has turned a standard in professional practice. With the exception of stances with (strong) philosophical motivation, it seems a fairly shared intuition that there is no unique acceptable logical theory. One can define the subject matter of logic as “cogent reasoning” (van Benthem [1]) and the principal tool to study it has been mathematical structures for more than a century. The power of mathematical methods allowed for the description and the theoretical control of countless logical systems, but at the same time converted fruitfulness into a problem. Which ones of the infinitely many logics that are available in the literature are principled and meaningful? How can one give an account of the intuitively sound claim that cogent reasoning cannot be just anything? Our proposal here is to seek in the theory of argumentation, and its mathematical representation in game theory, the principles of a logical pluralism under control.}

^{Dialogical logic ([2], [3], [4]) provides a conceptual setting for this proposal. Building upon a game theoretical core, dialogical logic captures the meaning of the elementary logical notions as expressions of the features of a certain type of argumentation games where two players interact, asserting claims and challenging them. More precisely, usual dialogical games are two players zero-sum well founded games, where the first player (the Proponent (P)) puts forth a main claim (the thesis of the dialogue), while the other one (the Opponent (O)) tries to refute it. The truth of a formula is understood in terms of the ability for the player who asserted it to defend it against allowed criticisms. A formula is said to be dialogically valid if the Proponent has a winning strategy in the dialogue associated with it. The rules of dialogical games belong to two categories: particle rules, that define the local form of the game according to the main connective of the formula at stake, and structural rules that define the global organisation of the game. The later define the properties of the notion of validity : one changes the logic by changing the structural rules.}

^{A crucial feature of dialogical systems is the so-called formal restriction. This structural rules states that P can assert an atom iff O conceded this atom first. This rule has a strong argumentation theoretic content: it amounts to say that a claim of P is valid if he is able to defend it using only arguments that are grounded on the assertions (or arguments) of O, in the sense that all the non-logical claims are first made by O. Thus the properties of a dialogical system relies essentially on the way P can use the information conceded by O. For instance, the differences between classical, intuitionnistic, (some) relevant and linear logic can all be expressed as constraints on the way P uses the conceded information.}

^{Our point is thus the following. Let us define a game in which P is free to use the conceded information in a variety of ways, but with some cost defined for types of moves, according to the information flow they entail. Thus P can have a set of winning strategies in the game for a given thesis (i.e. strategies leading to a final position where O is to move and there is no legal move available to him), and the costs allow to compute the class of optimal strategies. Such strategies capture what one can see as the best ways to argue for the thesis, given some notion of what is a good argumentation which is coded in the costs of the moves. If the cost of the strategy is the cost of its most expansive move, then the cheaper strategy for a thesis indicates the class of logics in which the thesis is valid. A clear and easy implementation would give increasing costs to logics ordered by inclusion of their sets of theorems. Now if one allows for a computation of strategy cost based on the sum of the costs of the individual moves the picture gets much more intricate. At least it can be said that this possibility opens a whole field of future research on the application of decision theoretical methods and concepts in evaluating argumentative strategies.}

^References

^{[1] van Benthem, J. “Foreword” in Abduction and Induction, Flach P. & Kakas A. (eds.), Kluwer, Dordrecht,  2002.  
[2] Lorenz, K. & Lorenzen, P. Dialogische Logik, , Wissenschaftlische Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1978.  
[3] Rahman, S. Uber Dialogue, Protologische Categorien und andere Seltenheiten, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1993.  
[4] Rahman, S. & Keiff, L. “On how to be a dialogician” in Logic, Thought and Action, Vanderveken D. (ed.) Springer, Dordrecht, 2004.}

Jacques Dubucs
(IHPST, University of Paris I, France)

Much work has been done since Beth's and Hintiikka's analysis to vindicate Kant's philosophy of mathematics in the light of modern logic. It is today widely recognized that most of that work relies on an interpretation that distorts textual evidence at some extent and that mainly neglects the discrepance between pre-critical and transcendantal points of view. The paper proposes a new interpretation, grounded on the notion of semi-necessity, conceived as a modality halfway between mere contingency and logical necessity, and it explores the means of clarifying it in the light of the modern notion of intended model.

More information regarding this Colloquium may be obtained from the website
http://cfcul.fc.ul.pt/coloquioscentro/coll.unidade_cc.htm